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OWNER RBsPONsmn.STATUTEs--Plaintiff brought an action to recover for damage to his automobile resulting from a collision with defendant's automobile. Each of the vehicles was being negligently operated by the son of the owner. A statute provided
that one operating a vehicle with the owner's consent should be deemed the
owner's agent. 1 The court refused to give an instruction which would preclude
plaintiff's recovery if the jury found that his son's negligence contributed to the
accident. On appeal from a verdict for the plaintiff, held, affirmed. The statute
makes the bailor liable to persons injured because of the bailee's negligence but
does not impute this negligence to the bailor so as to bar recovery against a third
NEGLIGENCE-AuTOMOBILE BAILMENTs--EFFECT OF

ITY

1 "Whenever any motor vehicle, • . • shall be operated upon any public street or highway of this state, ••• with the consent of the owner, express or implied, the operator thereof
shall in case of accident, be deemed the agent of the owner of such motor vehicle in the
operation thereof." 12 Minn. Stat. Ann. (1945) §170.54.
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person.2 Furthermore, the "family-purpose" doctrine3 has been superseded by the
statute. Jacobsen v. Dailey, 228 Minn. 201, 36 N.W. (2d) 711 (1949).
Several jurisdictions have had occasion to consider whether the contributory
negligence of the driver may be imputed to the owner of a motor vehicle under
legislation similar to that involved in the principal case.4 Of these, only the New
York courts have reached a similar result. 5 Moreover, the New York statute, unlike the one in Minnesota, does not purport to create an agency relationship between the owner and driver, but merely provides that "Every owner of a motor
vehicle ... shall be liable ... for injuries .•. resulting from negligence in the
operation of such vehicle ... by any person operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner. . . ."6 Unable, therefore, to lean too
heavily on authority, the Minnesota court finds justification for its holding in the
undesirability of broadening the application of the contributory negligence rule,7
an admittedly harsh doctrine.8 Nevertheless, to allow this doctrine to continue to
operate generally while restricting its operation under the statute in question
works manifestly unjust results. A Minnesota resident familiar with this rule
might likely register his car in the name of some non-driving member of his family so that in the event of an accident in which he is contributorily negligent, he
may still recover for the damage to his car through the family member in whose
name the car is registered; 9 but the other party to the accident might be unable
to recover, though his fault be less, simply because he happened to be unaware
of the rule or truthful enough to keep title in his own name. 10 The working of
Accord: Ristau v. Riley, (Minn. 1950) 41 N.W. (2d) 772.
See PnossBR, ToRTS 500-503 (1941).
Mills v. Gabriel, 284 N.Y. 755, 31 N.E. (2d) 512 (1940); Secured Finance Co. v.
Chicago Ry., 207 Iowa 1105, 224 N.W. 88 (1929); National Trucking & Storage Co. v.
Driscoll, (Mun. App. D.C. 1949) 64 A. (2d) 304; Milgate v. Wraith, 19 Cal. (2d) 297,
121 P. (2d) IO (1942); Meisenheimer v. Pullen, 271 Mich. 509, 260 N.W. 756 (19.35).
See 15 Iowa Code Ann. (1949) §321.493, Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §256.29, and N.Y.
Veh. & Traf. Law (McKinney 1950) (April Pamphlet) Art. 5, §59, which provide merely
that the owner shall be liable for the negligence of one using his car with his consent.
D.C. Code (1940) §40-403, is almost identical to the Minnesota statute, supra note 1.
Cal. Veh. Code (1943) §402 is unique in that it expressly provides that the negligence of
the driver is imputable to the owner.
5 Gochee v. Wagner, 232 App. Div. 401, 250 N.Y.S. 102 (1931).
6 N.Y. Consol. Laws (Cahill 1930) c. 64-a, §59.
"Neither the word 'agent' nor the word 'servant' is used in the statute. • . . The
driver is not in fact the agent of the ov1mer and the statute does not make him such. No
intention can be found in this statute to broaden the scope of the doctrine of contributory
negligence." Gochee v. Wagner, supra note 5 at 403.
7 See Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, IO N.W. (2d) 406
(1943); National Trucking and Storage Co. v. Driscoll, supra note 4 at 300; 34 MINN. L.
RBv. 58 (1949).
8 PROSSER, TORTS 403 (1941).
9 The common law rule, which according to the principal case is left untouched by
the statute, is that the driver's contributory negligence does not bar suit by the bailor-owner
against a negligent third party. 65 C.J.S. 808. But see Langford Motor Co. v. McClung
Construction Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 46 S.W. (2d) 388.
lO Is a court likely to look through this subterfuge? For a negative answer see Nash
v. Lang, 268 Mass. 407, 167 N.E. 762 (1929).
2
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this subterfuge is facilitated by the additional holding in the principal case that
the "family-purpose" doctrine ( whereby imputed contributory negligence may
How from an intra-family automobile bailment) is superseded by the financial
responsibility statute. It would certainly seem that the Minnesota legislature did
not intend to put such a price on ignorance or such a penalty on truth. 11 An
elementary rule of statutory construction is that the words used are generally to
be interpreted in the light of their recognized common law meaning.12 Thus it
is indeed doubtful whether the Minnesota legislature, had it intended to produce a result such as that reached by this court, would have employed the language it did.13
Bernard L. Goodman
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An additional policy consideration involved is that "if the negligence of the driver

is not imputable to the owner in all cases where consent to drive has been given • • • this

would lead to the exercise of less care on the part of owners in intrusting their cars to
others." National Trucking & Storage Co. v. Driscoll, supra note 4, at 308.
12 CRAWPORD, STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION §228 (1940). Of course, at common law
the contributory negligence of an agent is imputed to the principal so as to bar suit against
a third party, 38 AM. Jun. 922. Before the Minnesota view. was announced in the Christensen case, it was believed that such would be the case where the agency relationship was
created by statute. 21 MINN. L. REv. 823 at 835 (1937); Forrester v. Jerman, (D.C. Cir.
1937) 90 F. (2d) 412; Reno, "Imputed Contributory Negligence in Automobile Bailments,"
82 Umv. PA. L. REv. 213 at 219 (1934).
13 At the time the Minnesota owner responsibility statute was first drafted, the lawmaking body of that state had ample model in legislation of other jurisdictions using words
far more consistent with the holding of the Minnesota court than those of the Minnesota
statute itself. Iowa Code (1931) §5026; Cal. Civ. Code (Deering 1931) §1714¼; N.Y.
Consol. Laws (Cahill 1930) c. 64-a, §59; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) §4648. Unlike the
first Minnesota statute, [Minn. Laws (1933) c. 351, §4] none of these earlier statutes
expressly purported to create an agency relationship between a· bailee and bailor of an
automobile. Query: When Minnesota adopted its first statute on this subject, two years
after the decision in the Gochee case (supra note 6), did the legislature employ the words
"shall be deemed the agent •••" with a view to avoiding the results reached in the New
York courts?

